Abstract: This paper presents evidence of the e¤ect of labor unrest on labor production in the policing context using data from New York City. When contract negotiations last for an extended period, old contracts can expire before new ones are approved. Working under an expired contract, or being "out of contract," can be costly for police o¢ cers both monetarily and psychologically. This paper studies the e¤ect of time spent out of contract on police misconduct using new data and a research design that exploits the fact that di¤erent ranks of o¢ cers are out of contract at di¤erent points in time and for di¤erent lengths of time. I …nd evidence that incidents of police misconduct increase with the amount of time spent out of contract. Threats to identi…cation arising from the possibility that police misconduct could also a¤ect police time out of contract are addressed with an instrumental variables speci…cation that instruments police contract status with …re…ghter contract status. The …nding that police labor unrest a¤ects police misconduct has implications both for the economics literature on the e¤ect of labor frustration on labor production and for the criminology literature on the determinants of police misconduct. 
Introduction
What happens when police o¢ cers become unhappy and dissatis…ed with their contract negotiations? Prior research demonstrates that when police expressions of labor unrest are highly publicized, public safety is rarely jeopardized. Speci…cally Chandrasekher (2010) shows that ticketwriting slowdowns, a highly publicized labor action where police o¢ cers reduce their ticket-writing productivity as a way of exerting …nancial pressure on city government o¢ cials to pass a unionfriendly contract, have no e¤ect on crime rates. The result that highly publicized forms of police labor unrest do not tend to a¤ect public safety is perhaps not surprising; a police union that is attempting to garner public support for its pay raise has every incentive to keep the public happy by maintaining public safety throughout the period of labor unrest.
Not all expressions of labor frustration 1 , however, may be well-publicized. This paper seeks to determine whether other, more subtle manifestations of labor unrest may be at work during police labor negotiations that may negatively impact public safety. In particular, this paper investigates the general relationship between police misconduct levels and the amount of time spent working under an expired contract, even in the absence of any publicized expressions of labor unrest. As is dictated by labor law in some states, when a police union's contract expires before it is able to successfully negotiate a new contract with the city, the o¢ cers typically continue to work and collect wages according to the old contract's pay rate. When a new contract is ultimately negotiated, the police o¢ cers are retroactively paid the di¤erence between the new and old wage rates for the time spent "out of contract," or working under an expired contract. The amount paid, however, does not include interest. Therefore, being out of contract can be costly to a police o¢ cer, especially when the labor negotiations last for multiple years. This …nancial loss, combined with the antagonistic labor negotiations and the uncertainty of the outcome have the potential to increase the overall level of labor unrest, even in the absence of an o¢ cial public demonstration of the unrest such as a ticketwriting slowdown. Using data from New York City, I quantitatively estimate the impact of being out of contract on the level of police misconduct. My results show that working under an expired contract, in and of itself, is positively related to police misconduct. Speci…cally, as the proportion 1 In what follows, I will use the terms labor frustration, labor unrest, and labor strife interchangeably. of the last 24 months spent out of contract increases by 0.10, the number of o¢ cers involved in substantiated or veri…ed incidents of police misconduct increases by 9%. The types of substantiated misconduct complaints that are most a¤ected are abuses of authority and discourteous behavior; there is no statistically signi…cant e¤ect on excessive force or o¤ensive language complaints.
Literature Review
This paper contributes to two di¤erent literatures. First, there is the general economics literature on the e¤ect of labor frustration on labor production. This literature seeks to understand how the quantity and quality of goods produced may or may not be a¤ected when workers become dissatis…ed and unhappy because of a disappointing labor climate, typically concerning worker compensation. This literature is broad in that it covers both private sector and public sector workers. Alexandre Mas' 2006 article is not only one of the most prominent articles in this literature, but also happens to be extremely relevant to the current study because it also focuses on police o¢ cers. Mas (2006) studies …nal-o¤er arbitration outcomes for New Jersey police o¢ cers involved in salary contract disputes with the city. During …nal-o¤er arbitration, both sides give the arbitrator their proposed salary bids and the arbitrator must choose between them. The arbitrator's choice is binding on both parties. Mas shows that police o¢ cer productivity decreases (in terms of lower arrest rates and higher crime rates) in the months following an arbitration loss relative to the months following an arbitration win. Furthermore, Mas demonstrates that these losses are larger when the ultimate arbitration award is farther from the o¢ cers' desired award.
Mas' analysis provides convincing evidence that police o¢ cer productivity is a¤ected by labor unrest. One di¢ culty that Mas faces in his study is that he does not have access to data on police misconduct for New Jersey police o¢ cers. As a result, he is not able to investigate the e¤ect of disappointing contract outcomes on police misconduct-which he acknowledges would be the ideal measure of productivity in the public safety context. 2 In another paper, "Strikes, Scabs, and Tread Separations: Labor Strife and the Production of Defective Bridgestone/Firestone Times", Mas and Krueger con…rm the relationship between labor 2 Mas (2006), pg. 788. frustration and product quality in the private sector. The authors …nd strong evidence linking the Firestone defective-tire recall of 2000 to an earlier period of labor strife in the Firestone factories when workers were on strike.
While Mas (2006) and Mas and Krueger (2004) present strong evidence of a relationship between labor frustration and product quantity/quality, two other papers in the literature do not. In a study of strikes by Pennsylvania teachers from 1997 -2006 , Turner (2008 …nds that labor strikes had no e¤ect on the education production process, as measured by student test scores. Similarly, Chandrasekher (2010) …nds that a major labor action by New York City Police o¢ cers in 1997, a ticket writing slowdown, had no e¤ect on crime rates. Thus, one de…ciency in the labor frustrationproductivity literature is that it currently o¤ers no explanation for why some instances of labor frustration negatively impact the quality and quantity of production and others don't. In this paper, I o¤er up one possible theory: that, at least as it concerns public sector employees, the way in which labor frustration is expressed matters. Speci…cally, highly publicized forms of labor frustration, such as formal labor strikes (Turner 2008) and slowdowns (Chandrasekher 2010) , are less likely to impact labor production because public sector employees know that during these highly publicized labor actions, their work products (public education and public safety, respectively) are highly scrutinized and any perceived reductions in productivity would hurt the public's support for their cause. Other more subtle expressions of labor frustration, such as those that manifest after the announcement of a disappointing arbitration outcome (Mas 2006) or those that manifest after the expiration of a contract (current paper), may be more likely to negatively impact labor production because they are less scrutinized. For private sector employees, on the other hand, the public's support for their cause should matter less since their contract negotiations are with private business owners, rather than the city. This perhaps explains why the Firestone labor strike, a highly publicized expression of labor frustration, nonetheless led to a reduction in the quality of the production of Firestone tires.
The current paper, then, seeks to extend and contribute to this literature on the production consequences of labor unrest in three ways: …rst, by o¤ering up a unifying theory that explains why the literature has failed to …nd a relationship between labor frustration and labor production in certain contexts; second, by looking at the e¤ect of labor frustration on police misconduct (a productivity outcome variable that was unavailable in the Mas 2006 analysis due to data limitations); and third, by examining the e¤ect on labor productivity of working under an expired contract-a di¤erent type of labor unrest that has not yet been studied in this literature but that has practical importance for certain classes of workers like police o¢ cers who often work under expired contracts.
(See Section 3 for more details on police contract negotiations).
The other literature that this research seeks to contribute to is the criminology literature on the determinants of police misconduct. Before jumping into a discussion of the previous police misconduct literature, it may be helpful to de…ne what is meant by police misconduct, and to distinguish it from police brutality, a term that is often confused with police misconduct. Police misconduct is any illegal or improper act by a police o¢ cer. 3 Police brutality, on the other hand, is any deliberate and unnecessary use of excessive physical force by a police o¢ cer. Thus, police misconduct is a broad category that can include acts of brutality as well as other non-violent types of behavior such as abuse of authority, discourtesy, or o¤ensive language. By far, most of the police misconduct literature has focused on the sub-topic of police brutality, perhaps because it is the most serious type of police misconduct. As a result, most of what we know about police misconduct comes from the sub-literature on police brutality, which I review below. Note, however, that even though my literature review is focused on police brutality, in my analysis, I study all types of police misconduct generally. 4
The Determinants of Police Brutality
What has the criminology literature taught us thus far, both empirically and theoretically, about the determinants of police brutality in general, and the role that labor strife might have to play in particular? Quantitative studies of the determinants of police brutality have mostly focused on identifying the individual characteristics of the o¢ cers and victims that are most highly correlated with the incidence of police brutality. For example, prior research has shown that female o¢ cers and black o¢ cers are less likely to be accused of police brutality (Lersch and Mieczkowski 2005) .
Similarly, some studies have found that older o¢ cers are less likely to use force than younger o¢ cers (Croft 1987, cited in Lersch and Mieczkowski 2005) . On the victim side, most studies have found that blacks have the highest likelihood of being subject to police brutality (Lersch and Mieczkowski 2005) . While these studies are informative, most proceed through bivariate analyses rather than multivariate regression analyses; thus, several scholars have called for more sophisticated statistical evaluations of the determinants of police brutality (West 1988 , Griswold 1994 , and Lersch and Mieczkowski 2005 . Moreover, no empirical studies to date have analyzed the e¤ect of labor frustration on police brutality.
The theoretical literature on the determinants of police brutality is also developing. Currently, there are three main candidate theories that seek to explain police brutality. 5 The …rst theory is a psychological or "rotten apple" theory. According to this theory, police brutality is not an organizational or system-wide problem but rather a problem of individuals. That is, police brutality occurs when certain undesirable people of poor moral integrity are able join the police force. This theory implies that very little can be done to reduce police brutality, other than removing problem o¢ cers after they have been identi…ed. The second theory is an organizational theory concerning the structure of the police work environment. According to this theory, police brutality occurs because the structure of the police work environment is such that o¢ cers have a great deal of autonomy and discretion in their jobs. Police o¢ cers are not directly observed by their immediate superiors (or by large groups of concerned citizens) in their day to day patrol activities. The lack of general supervision over most of their policing activities creates an environment that is amenable to police brutality. This theory implies that changes in organizational structure (e.x.-better supervision, better policies specifying when force can be used) can reduce brutality. The third and …nal theory is a sociological theory concerning police subculture. This theory explains that, as a result of the unique pressures and dangers of the job, police o¢ cers tend to bond very closely with their co-workers, forming insular social cliques that discourage them from socializing with citizens in the general public. Once in these groups, pressures to be loyal to the group-regardless of the task requested-can override an individual o¢ cer's sense of morality. Unlike with the …rst two theories, the sociological theory o¤ers no immediately obvious implications for how brutality can be reduced.
The current police brutality theoretical framework is still in need of development. As is pointed out by Lersch and Mieczkowski (2005) , the main di¢ culty with all three theories is that they fail to o¤er an explanation for why some police o¢ cers engage in brutality and others don't. Another de…ciency that is particularly relevant to the current paper is that none of the theories seem broad enough to encompass a simple theory of how job stress a¤ects police brutality, let alone our economic theory of how labor frustration and dissatisfaction may lead to lower product quality (or, in this case, higher police brutality).
Background on the NYPD Contracting Process
As with other public unions, the police contract negotiation process is often lengthy and adversarial.
If the negotiation process goes on too long, police contracts can expire before new ones are approved by the union. When this happens, the police departments are "out of contract" or working under an expired contract. New York law dictates that when a contract expires before a new one is rati…ed, the o¢ cers can continue to work and be paid under the terms of the expired contract until the new contract is rati…ed. Once the new contract is rati…ed, the police are awarded back pay which is equivalent to the di¤erence between the new (and presumably higher) pay rate and the old pay rate multiplied by the number of months worked while out of contract.
Since police o¢ cers do continue to get paid when they are out of contract and lost wages are ultimately awarded through "back pay", it might seem that being out of contract is not a bad outcome for police. There are, however, several disadvantages that police o¢ cers may face as a result of being out of contract. First and most obvious, pay raises are delayed. As Mas'research indicates, to the extent that o¢ cers expect timely pay raises, any delays in this regard could be psychologically disappointing which may have an e¤ect on police productivity in terms of arrest or crime rates. Secondly, when back pay is ultimately awarded, o¢ cers are not paid any interest on the delayed wages. Thus, the longer that a police o¢ cer spends out of contract, the more money she stands to lose. Third, the NYPD contract negotiating process can be extremely antagonistic and the outcomes can be di¢ cult to predict. As a result, o¢ cers might become more frustrated the longer they spend out of contract.
Another dimension of the NYPD contracting process (one that I ultimately exploit in my research design) is that the di¤erent ranks of o¢ cers have di¤erent unions that negotiate independently with the city for their contract. There are …ve basic ranks in the NYPD and they each have their own union. Speci…cally, the rank and …le police o¢ cers'union is called the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, the detectives'union is called the Detectives'Endowment Association, the sergeants' union is called the Sergeants' Benevolent Association, the lieutenants' union is called the Lieutenants' Benevolent Association, and …nally the captains' union is called the Captains' Endowment Association. I drop captains from my analysis because their misconduct rate is nearly always zero over the sample period. My sample thus includes four ranks of o¢ cers: rank and …le police o¢ cers, detectives, sergeants, and lieutenants. (In what follows, I will use the term "patrolmen" to refer to the rank and …le police o¢ cers and the term "police o¢ cers" to generally refer to members of the police force, regardless of rank.) As a result of the independent negotiating and contracting processes, each of the ranks was out of contract at di¤erent points in time and for di¤erent lengths of time during my sample period. Appendix Table A of report, type of misconduct alleged (excessive force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, or o¤ensive language) 6 , and whether or not the allegation was ultimately substantiated (meaning independently veri…ed) by the CCRB. The data also include the rank of the o¢ cer.
Construction of the Misconduct Rate
When a citizen reports police misconduct to the CCRB, a new case …le or complaint is opened.
All allegations of misconduct arising out of that incident are categorized under a single complaint number. However, that single complaint may cover multiple victims and multiple allegations of misconduct against multiple o¢ cers. 7 For example, if a man were to allege that three police o¢ cers each assaulted him and then threatened to arrest him, he would …le one complaint with six allegations: for each o¢ cer there would be an allegation of excessive force and an allegation of abuse of authority.
To construct the rank-speci…c, monthly misconduct rate, I divide the total number of o¢ cerincidents per rank per month by the total number of police o¢ cers of that rank employed by the police department in that month. 8 The number of o¢ cer-incidents is the total number of separate incidents each o¢ cer is accused of in a particular month. For example, if a single o¢ cer were to engage in three di¤erent acts of misconduct in a particular month, each of those three acts would be included in the numerator of the misconduct rate. An alternative metric for the misconduct rate would be the total number of o¢ cers accused of misconduct per month divided by the rank size.
Since I am chie ‡y interested in detecting changes in the level of misconduct experienced by the NYC population, I prefer the …rst metric since repeat o¢ cer-o¤enders are counted multiple times in the numerator. Functionally, however, the two metrics (the o¢ cer-incident-based misconduct rate and the o¢ cer-based misconduct rate) are very similar because o¢ cers typically are not accused of more than one separate incident of misconduct per month. Furthermore, for completeness, all analyses in the paper were computed with both the o¢ cer-incident-based misconduct rate and the o¢ cer-based misconduct rate and none of the results were substantively di¤erent.
Data Limitations
There are a three major limitations of the data. First, the data only represent misconduct claims …led with the CCRB. In general, complaints of misconduct against the police can be …led with the CCRB, with the NYPD Internal A¤airs Bureau, or with the NYPD themselves at a particular precinct. Unfortunately, misconduct data from the NYPD were not available to me. Therefore, my results can only speak to the e¤ect of labor unrest on misconduct claims where (1) the alleged victim decided …le a complaint and (2) they …led that complaint with the CCRB.
Secondly, my data only includes misconduct complaints in which at least one of the accused o¢ cers was ultimately identi…ed during the course of the investigation. This could be a potential source of bias if the identi…cation rate changed over time in a way that was correlated with the labor unrest. If, for example, the total number of misconduct claims stayed the same or declined during the out of contract periods but the identi…cation rate increased because CCRB personnel had more time to investigate each case, then the number of identi…ed complaints could be spuriously biased upwards. I was able to obtain monthly data on the total number of complaints (both identi…ed and unidenti…ed) from the CCRB in order to explore this question. The results showed that the identi…cation rate remained roughly stable between 60 and 70 percent throughout my entire sample period. 9 The third limitation of the data concerns the substantiated misconduct rate. The substantiated misconduct rate is the veri…ed misconduct rate-to be distinguished from the "regular" or total misconduct rate which includes both substantiated and unsubstantiated misconduct o¢ cer-incidents.
When the CCRB receives a complaint, they investigate it to see if it has merit. The investigation will often involve a detailed interview with the complaining party as well as with the accused o¢ cer.
After a thorough investigation has been made, the CCRB review board hears all the evidence and makes a determination as to whether the accusation is substantiated or not. Thus, the substantiated misconduct rate is, in a sense, the "true" misconduct rate-i.e. the misconduct rate that has been purged of all unfounded allegations. As such, the substantiated misconduct rate is the primary outcome variable of interest in my analysis. 9 Tables are available from the author upon request.
The one limitation of the substantiated misconduct rate is that the substantiation review process requires a lengthy investigation that can often exceed a year. As a result, my sample of substantiated misconduct complaints is smaller than my sample of misconduct complaints. In particular, while both samples begin in January 1996, the substantiated sample stops in October 2006 because claims made in November 2006 and after were still in the substantiation review process at the time the data were made available to me. The full misconduct sample extends until August 2007.
Contract Data
Details on the dates that the four police unions were in and out contract come from the NYC O¢ ce of Labor Relations. The New York City O¢ ce of Labor Relations provided all of the labor contracts that were negotiated and signed from 1996 to 2007. During this period, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association negotiated …ve contracts and the Sergeants' Endowment Association, the Detectives'Endowment Association, and the Lieutenants'Benevolent Association each negotiated four contracts. I used these contracts to identify the o¢ cial dates of the contract agreements.
The time out of contract was de…ned as the period from the ending date of the previous contract to the date that the next contract was signed by the NYC Labor Relations Commissioner. 10 The signature date is the date when the contract and all wage increase details become …nalized. As such, it is a proxy for the end of the o¢ cers'labor unrest.
Appendix Table A Table 2, 58.7% of the allegations were judged to be unsubstantiated or unfounded. Another 18.4% of allegations were administratively closed because either the complainant or victim was unavailable or uncooperative, and 4.1% of allegations were resolved via mediation or conciliation. Only 6,533 or 6.6% of allegations were substantiated by the CCRB-meaning that they were veri…ed through an independent investigation. Because I am primarily concerned with substantiated misconduct allegations, Table 3 breaks down the 6,533 substantiated misconduct allegations by type: excessive force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, and o¤ensive language. Abuse of authority allegations are by far the most numerous, comprising 60% of all allegations; excessive force, discourtesy, and o¤ensive language allegations account for 21%, 17% and 3% of all allegations, respectively. An investigation of the subcategories within the four main categories of allegations is also interesting. Most of the excessive force allegations (67.23%) are for physical force which includes any type of pushing, shoving, or hitting.
The act of improperly pointing a gun is the second most common type of excessive force alleged (6.01%). Within the category of abuse of authority, the most common types of substantiated misconduct alleged are improper frisk and/or search and (14.80%) and improper question and/or stop (13.03%). This is not surprising given the rapid growth in the NYPD's stop and frisk program over the 2000s. 11 By far the most common type of discourtesy alleged is discourteous words (86.65%).
Within the o¤ensive language category, racial hate speech is the predominant type of substantiated 1 1 Reference misconduct alleged (57.99%).
I now turn to analyzing trends in the number of o¢ cers accused of both substantiated and total misconduct, with the ultimate goal of determining whether there is a relationship between the number of o¢ cer accusations and police labor unrest. As mentioned above, there were 6,533 substantiated allegations of police misconduct. These 6,533 substantiated allegations involved 3,654 o¢ cer-incidents. (See Table 1 .) This means that there were 3,654 di¤erent instances in which an o¢ cer was accused of being involved in a substantiated misconduct incident. For each of these 3,654 o¢ cer-incidents, I determined the exact year and month that the incident occurred as well as the rank of the o¢ cer accused. I then counted the number of substantiated o¢ cer-incidents per rank, in each year and month, from January 1996 to October 2006 (130 months in total).
Ultimately, my substantiated misconduct sample includes 520 observations -130 observations for each of the four ranks. The exact same sample construction process was followed for the 99,444 total misconduct allegations that involved 51,632 o¢ cer accusations. Thus, I also have a total misconduct sample that covers the period from January 1996 to August 2007 and includes 560 observations-140 observations for each of the four ranks.
A preliminary analysis of my substantiated and total misconduct samples shows that both types of misconduct are rare. As is shown in Table 4 , on average, there are only 7 substantiated o¢ cerincidents alleged per rank-month and 92 total o¢ cer-incidents alleged per rank-month. Given the average rank size of 9,093, this translates to an average substantiated misconduct rate of 0.07% and an average misconduct rate of 0.85% for all ranks combined.
When the substantiated misconduct rate is analyzed for each rank separately, some predictable patterns emerge. Speci…cally, o¢ cers at the patrolmen and sergeant rank have the highest substantiated misconduct rates (0.076% and 0.082% respectively) followed by detectives (0.069%) and lieutenants (0.058%). Patrolmen and sergeants also have higher total misconduct rates than the other ranks. The higher misconduct rates (both substantiated and total) for patrolmen and sergeants accord with my expectations given that these two groups have a higher level of interaction with the public than lieutenants and detectives. 12 1 2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_City_Police_Department#Ranks_of_the_NYPD Figures 1 and 2 graph the substantiated misconduct rate and the total misconduct rate, respectively, for each rank over the entire sample period. One thing that is immediately noticeable from the total misconduct graph is that there is a strong dip in the total misconduct rates of all ranks during the 9/11 period, which is indicated in the graph with a vertical red line. This dip is likely due to a variety of factors including: a lower level of policing during that time as o¢ cers of all ranks were heavily involved in the activities surrounding the events of 9/11, a lower level of actual police misconduct given the sense of national camaraderie at the time, and a lower likelihood of citizens …ling accusations against police o¢ cers during this time out of reverence to fallen o¢ cers.
Does the misconduct rate vary by contract status? To give a graphical sense of the relationship between police misconduct and time spent working under an expired contract, as well as sense of the di¤ering periods of labor strife for the each of the ranks, Figures 3A through 3D graph the substantiated misconduct rate and the "time spent working out of contract" variable for each rank separately. As will be explained in greater detail in the panel data analysis section (Section 5.2.1), the "time spent working out of contract" variable is a variable which gives the proportion of the last 24 months that a particular rank's union spent working under an expired contract. The positive relationship between the substantiated misconduct rate and the time spent out of contract variable, especially for patrolmen, sergeants and lieutenants, is striking. For example, Figure 3A , the patrolmen …gure, shows a very strong downward trend for the substantiated misconduct rate during the 1997-2000 in contract period and a very strong upward trend for the post-2000 out of contract period. The relationship between the substantiated misconduct rate and time spent out of contract is also visually perceptible for sergeants ( Figure 3B ) and lieutenants ( Figure 3C ).
For detectives ( Figure 3D ), a graphical correspondence between substantiated misconduct and the time spent out of contract is less evident. When one looks at the relationship between the total misconduct rate and time spent working out of contract by rank ( Figures 4A through 4D) , it is clear that a correspondence between the total misconduct rate and labor unrest exists as well, though the relationship is weaker than with the substantiated misconduct rate.
While this graphical evidence is supportive of a positive relationship between police misconduct and labor strife, it is possible that other non-contract factors are responsible for the patterns present in the data. For example, one concern is that most ranks exhibit a gradual increase in their respective misconduct rates from about 2000 onwards. If these increases are instead attributable to citywide secular factors, such as gradual changes in the demographic pro…le of the New York City population or increases in the overall activity level of the police department, then simple correlations between the misconduct rate and time spent out of contract will be biased. To account for this, I now turn to my regression analysis, which allows me to very explicitly control for some of the secular factors that could be a¤ecting o¢ cer misconduct.
Poisson Regression Analysis
I use Poisson regression to model substantiated and total misconduct o¢ cer-incidents because both variables are non-negative and integer-valued. The Poisson regression model is especially well suited for the substantiated misconduct o¢ cer-incidents because it often takes on the value zero (10% of the sample). In a general Poisson regression model, y it conditional on x it follows a Poisson distribution. The density function is:
e it y it it y it ! for y it = 0; 1; 2::::
In addition, the conditional mean parameter, it , is strictly greater than zero since
In this case, y it is y ijm , the number of times that a substantiated misconduct incident is lodged against an o¢ cer of rank i in year j and month m. In alternative speci…cations, the dependent variable is the number of times any misconduct incident (substantiated or not) is lodged against an o¢ cer of rank i in year j and month m. Likewise, x it is x ijm , a vector of variables that are correlated with y ijm . Before moving on to a description of the panel data research design and estimation, a couple of things are worth pointing out as a preliminary matter. The …rst issue concerns overdispersion in the dependent variable. Both the substantiated misconduct incident data and the total misconduct incident data exhibit signs of overdispersion in the raw samples.
(As shown in Poisson regression has a natural interpretation as a rate, it is common to include the denominator variable of the rate (called the exposure variable) on the right-hand side in its natural logarithm form and with its coe¢ cient constrained to be one. 15 Here, because I want to control for di¤erences in the level of rank-speci…c misconduct that are due to di¤erences in rank size, I use rank size as an exposure variable in all Poisson regressions throughout this paper. Speci…cally, this means that ln(rank size) enters as a control variable in the Poisson regressions and its coe¢ cient is constrained to be one.
Panel Data Analysis
In this section, I analyze the relationship between time spent out of contract and o¢ cer misconduct using a monthly panel dataset. As mentioned in Section 5.1, for each rank, I have 130 monthly Speci…cally, I include rank …xed e¤ects to control for di¤erences between ranks in terms of their average misconduct levels, year …xed e¤ects to control for citywide trends (like the poverty rate, unemployment rate, etc.) that could a¤ect misconduct rates for all the ranks, and rank-by-year …xed e¤ects to control for any rank-speci…c factors that vary over time and are correlated with o¢ cer misconduct. These rank-by-year …xed e¤ects are crucial to the analysis because rankspeci…c time-variant controls were not available from any data provider for my analysis. Finally, the size of each rank is the exposure variable and so I include its natural logarithm in all of the Poisson regressions with its coe¢ cient constrained to be 1.
Results Labor unrest has a large and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on substantiated misconduct.
Speci…cally, as the proportion of the last 24 months spent working under an expired contract increases by 0.10, the number of times a police o¢ cer is accused of substantiated misconduct increases by 9%. 16 , 17 Substantiated misconduct is also a¤ected by felony arrests; one thousand additional felony arrests are associated with a 17% increase in the number of substantiated misconduct o¢ cerincidents. And, as we saw in the descriptive analysis, sergeants, detectives and lieutenants all have statistically signi…cant lower levels of substantiated misconduct than patrolmen.
The link between labor unrest and total reported misconduct (i.e.-veri…ed and unveri…ed misconduct combined) is less strong. A 0.10 increase in the proportion of the last two years spent working under an expired contract leads to only a 3.5% increase in the number of total misconduct o¢ cer-incidents. There is also a weaker link between total reported misconduct and felony arrests (9% here vs 17% for substantiated misconduct). Interestingly, the number of parking tickets issued is statistically correlated with total reported misconduct but not with substantiated misconduct.
This perhaps indicates a tendency amongst New Yorkers to lodge frivolous, retaliatory complaints against police o¢ cers in response to receiving parking tickets. Similarly, total reported misconduct, but not substantiated misconduct, was a¤ected by the September 11th terrorist attacks. Total reported misconduct was down by 20% during the month of the terrorist attacks. As with substantiated misconduct, sergeants, lieutenants, and detectives all have fewer total misconduct incidents lodged against them, even after controlling for ranks size. Finally, reports of misconduct tend to be lower during the winter months relative to the fall months. This seasonal trend is exactly reversed for accusations of substantiated misconduct which tend to be higher in the winter months, though the relationship is not statistically signi…cant.
I also investigate the relationship between labor unrest and di¤erent types of substantiated misconduct. For this analysis, I categorize each of the 3,564 substantiated misconduct o¢ cerincidents by its most serious allegation. As before, I then construct a panel data set that has the number of excessive force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, and o¤ensive language o¢ cer-incidents per rank, year and month. Using the same Poisson regression speci…cation as before, I …nd that working under an expired contract has an a¤ect on the number of abuse of authority and discourtesy o¢ cer-incidents; a 0.10 increase in the proportion of the last 24 months spent working 1 6 This result is robust to various out of contract time periods. 1 7 The exact percentage change in the mean response is given by the forumula (exp( )-1)*100. For simplicity, here I approximate the percentage change in E(yjx) for a one-unit change in x using the usual *100 semi-elasticity formula. Such approximations are valid since the 0 s of interest are small (typically less than 1).
under an expired contract increases abuse of authority incidents by 10% and discourtesy incidents by 16%. See Table 7 . A statistically signi…cant e¤ect on excessive force and o¤ensive language o¢ cer-incidents is not detected in the data.
IV Analysis
In this section, I use an instrumental variables analysis to address any possible simultaneity bias that could be a¤ecting the contract status-misconduct relationship. In theory, police contract status (i.e.-whether or ot a particular union is working under an expired contract in a given month) may itself be a¤ected by the underlying police misconduct rate. The level of police misconduct is an observable measure of police productivity. As such, high rates of police misconduct might be a point of contention in contract negotiations, perhaps leading to a delay in the process. If police contract status is indeed a¤ected by police misconduct, estimates of the e¤ect of contract status on police misconduct will be subject to simultaneity bias.
To begin, it is worthwhile noting that this type of bias is unlikely to exist given the institutional history of NYPD contracting. Historically, police productivity standards (for misconduct, clearance rates, arrest rates, etc.) have never been a part of the written contracts between a police union and the city. NYPD contracts have typically covered the basic topics (such as union recognition, hours and overtime, salaries, and bene…ts), without any mention of police performance. Still, I
cannot rule out the possibility that negotiations over police misconduct standards informally a¤ect the negotiation process, and thus the time spent out of contract. Therefore, in order to address this possible concern, I use an instrumental variables approach. In New York City, municipal contracts with public unions are subject to pattern bargaining. In particular, this means that, in any given round of bargaining, the rank and …le police o¢ cers'(or patrolmen's) union and the rank and …le …re…ghters'union generally receive the same pay raises and their contracts are negotiated and signed at the same time. As a result, I can use …re…ghters'contract status as an instrument for patrolmen's contract status. 18 Thus, for my instrumental variables analysis, I restrict attention to the patrolmen (who are represented by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association) and the rank and …le …re…ghters (who are represented by the Uniformed Fire…ghters Association of Greater New York (UFA)). 19 The Uniformed Fire…ghters Association's contract status data is also given in Appendix Table A .
Fire…ghter contract status is a good instrument for two reasons. First, because of pattern bargaining, it is highly correlated with patrolmen contract status. Figure 5 graphs the contract status for patrolmen and …re…ghters over the sample period. As is clear from the graph, the two measures overlap to a great degree. (Correlation coe¢ cient 0.9839). Second, …re…ghter contract status is a good instrument because it does not have a direct e¤ect on police misconduct. and total reported misconduct o¢ cer-incidents, though the substantiated misconduct coe¢ cient is slightly smaller in the instrumental variables framework that in the non-instrumental variables framework.
Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that subtle, non-publicized forms of labor frustration are related to labor production. In particular, in New York City, when NYPD o¢ cers are forced to work under an expired contract, levels of misconduct increase with the amount of time o¢ cers spend out of contract. The e¤ect exists even in the absence of a more formal type of publicized police labor action such as a ticket-writing slowdown. These results have implications both for the economics literature on the general e¤ect of labor frustration on labor production and for the criminology literature on the determinants of police misconduct. Speci…cally, with regard to the economics literature, the results imply that the way in which public sector workers express their labor frustrations may impact the degree to which labor production is negatively a¤ected, with highly publicized expressions of labor frustration being less likely to have a negative e¤ect. The results also contribute 
